Cutting Porter’s Last Diamond: Competitive and Comparative (Dis)advantages in the Dutch Flower Cluster by E. TAVOLETTI & R. TE VELDE
E NT R E P R EN EU R S HIP AN D IN TE R NA TI ONA L M AN AGE M EN T
Cutting Porter’s Last Diamond: Competitive
and Comparative (Dis)advantages in the Dutch Flower
Cluster
Ernesto Tavoletti Æ Robbin te Velde
Received: 14 March 2008 / Accepted: 13 April 2008 / Published online: 10 July 2008
 Springer-Verlag 2008
Abstract The Dutch are the world’s leaders in the flower business even though
they seem to lack comparative advantage in the traditional sense. Comparative
advantages played a role in the history of the Dutch flower cluster and they still have
a role today. Based on a critic of Porter’s theories, the investigation suggests that the
exploitation of comparative advantages is allowed only to those firms and clusters
that already possess a competitive advantage, based on technology, logistics
infrastructure, innovation and human skills. So that comparative advantages and
competitive advantages join in a sort of helix process based on social innovation and
collective learning.
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Introduction
The present article is an exploratory case study of the Dutch flower cluster and it is
intended to forecast opportunities and threats for its future. The Dutch flower cluster
has gone through significant success for decades but recent development in the
international markets has raised questions about its competitiveness and environ-
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mental sustainability. Is the Dutch flower cluster going to survive the competition
from developing countries with cheap labour, superior climate and increasing long
distance distribution? Is there a future in a global economy for the over regulated
Dutch flower cluster based on family SMEs and greenhouses?
Our research questions have a general theoretical interest in the cluster literature
because agriculture clusters are potentially the more affected by superior Ricardian
comparative advantages in developing countries. As the Dutch flower cluster is a
very high-tech and knowledge intensive one, this makes the issue even more
relevant: Can the socially driven knowledge exchanges (Storper 1993, 1995, 1997)
and long lasting ‘‘social fabric’’ rival developing countries advantages on
production factors?
Porter is the most cited scholar with reference to clusters’ competitive advantage
and he defines a cluster as ‘‘a geographically proximate group of interconnected
companies and associated institutions in a particular field linked by commonalities
and complementarities’’ (Porter 2000, p.16) with a strong focus on constituent firms
and no significant reference to the cluster ‘‘social and territorial’’ knowledge while
the most recent literature about cluster competitive advantage shifted from the
cluster and its constituent firms to the character of the organizational knowledge
within the cluster (Tallman et al. 2004; Asheim et al. 2006).
Developing countries’ strong performance has introduced some doubts into the
general view. Are comparative advantages based on cheap labour and superior
climate taking ‘‘historical revenge’’, as opposed to Porter’s competitive advantages
and ‘‘knowledge based clusters’’ (Cooke and Leydesdorff 2006)? The article
investigates this theoretical issue through the Dutch flower cluster.
‘‘Theoretical framework and methodology’’ presents our theoretical framework
and methodology: starting from a critic of Porter’s competitive advantage approach,
we introduce a new theoretical framework based on a revaluation of comparative
advantages and their dynamic historical relationship with competitive advantages.
‘‘The Dutch flower cluster’’ provides an overview of the Dutch flower cluster.
‘‘Comparative (dis)advantages’’ analyses the cluster comparative advantages and
‘‘Competitive advantages’’ focuses on competitive advantages. ‘‘Explaining the
success of the Westland region’’ attempts an explanation of the Dutch flower cluster
success, through a micro and meso level analysis, paying special attention to
logistics as an important ‘‘value adding activity’’. ‘‘A synthesis of Dutch case’’
draws a synthesis and a conclusion about the Dutch case, based on the theoretical
framework developed in ‘‘The Dutch flower cluster’’.
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
The article is based on secondary data sources and a field visit that both the authors
had in April 2005. In the course of the field visit the authors had the opportunity to
hold a number of open-ended interviews with Dutch producers and dealers. The
present article is the final report of our case study research about the Dutch flower
cluster.
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Based on Porter’s work (Porter 1990a, b, 1998, Porter and van der Linde 1995),
we considered the following question: How can the Dutch be the world’s leaders
in the flower business when they lack comparative advantage in the traditional
sense? Porter’s answer, among other reasons, is that they have innovated at every
step in the value chain, creating technology and highly specialized inputs that
enhance resource productivity and offset the country’s natural disadvantages.
While we agree with Porter as far as the role of technology and innovation are
concerned in order to explain competitive advantage, we also stress the
importance that comparative advantages had in the development of the cluster
and highlight that comparative advantages still have a major role in the cluster
delocalisation trends.
It has already been suggested that Porter’s framework has ‘‘fundamental
misunderstandings of the factors that determine trade, particularly with respect to
the principle of comparative advantage. [..] Sustained prosperity may be achieved
without a nation becoming innovation-driven’’ (Davies and Ellis 2000, p. 1189).
Porter’s central claim was, in fact, the assertion that a ‘‘new paradigm’’ was created
by replacing the outdated concept of comparative advantage with the more dynamic
concept of ‘‘competitive advantage’’. Porter’s devaluation of the importance of
comparative costs is not supported by the Dutch flower cluster history or by its
current trends.
In addition, within Porter’s framework, activities are viewed in terms of hostile
relations between economic actors. He considers collaboration as a potential source
of erosion to long-term competitive advantage (Porter 2001). On the opposite, our
study suggest that collaboration and cooperation can lead to strengthening social
conditions, both at the inter-corporate and community levels, and ultimately
produce continuous increase of the market share’’ (Aktouf et al. 2005; Moore 1996).
The validity of Porter’s contribution to the discourse on competitive advantage is
reaffirmed but its theory is weakened by its neglect of cultural factors, historical
antecedents, the role of government (O’Shaughnessy 1996) and the still important
comparative advantages of nations.
Our exploratory investigation suggests that the exploitation (at home through
service providing and abroad through delocalisation) of comparative advantages
in new markets abroad is still important and is allowed only to those firms and
industries that already possess a competitive advantage in the international arena,
based on technology, logistics infrastructure, innovation and human skills. So
that comparative advantages and competitive advantages join themselves in a
sort of helix process, where each of them comes back to be dominant from time
to time but at a superior level that takes advantage of previous gains on both
front.
The main lesson is that regional strategies which are purely based on local
comparative advantages (such as ‘‘typicality’’ and access to niche markets) are not a
good option, unless it is reinforced by a clear competitive advantage strategy. Such
a strategy should be innovation and technology based, able to exploit these
comparative advantages and simultaneously able to exploit comparative advantages
abroad, wherever they are.
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The Dutch Flower Cluster
The Dutch flower cluster is concentrated in two areas in the densely populated
western part of The Netherlands, a northern part close to Amsterdam and a southern
part close to Rotterdam. Historically the southern region (‘Westland’) specialised in
vegetables. Due to increasing global competition at the end of the 1970s the
production shifted to (the less commodified) flowers. In both regions the flower
auction plays a pivotal role in the economic activities. Aalsmeer (north) and
Naaldwijk (south) are by far the biggest flower auctions in the world. They are also
competing.
Despite the modest size of the regions the economic performance is impressive.
On a national scale, the greenhouse cluster at large accounts for about 2% of GDP.1
The export value of cut flowers in 2003 was 3 billion Euro and represented over
80% of the EU export.2 Nearly 95% of all flowers in the world are traded at the
auctions of Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk (‘Flora Holland’). These figures are all the
more astonishing given the fact the Netherlands are neither endowed with a
favourable climate3 not with an abundance of land.4 The obvious question is of
course how the Dutch can be the world’s leaders in the flower business when they
lack comparative advantages in the traditional sense? According to Porter and van
der Linde (1995) this is because they have innovated at every step in the value
chain, creating technology and highly specialised inputs that enhance resource
productivity and offset the country’s natural disadvantages. This is certainly the
case, and we will further elaborate the thesis. However, the technological argument
is just a partial explanation of the success of the Dutch flower cluster. There are also
other issues at stake.
Comparative (Dis)advantages
First of all, with regard to the factor conditions, the comparative position of the
Netherlands is not as disadvantageous as it might seem. Although today there is
certainly a lack of space (especially in the Westland region) in earlier days the land
along the coast was sparsely populated. The rich loamy soil behind the sand dunes
is particularly suitable for growing flowers. The temperate climate is a blessing in
disguise considering the fact that the growth of flowers is especially negatively
1 About 4.5 billion Euro (1998). Source: De Groot (2001).
2 The share in fresh cut flowers comes close to 90%. This could be taken as an indicator for the relative
efficiency of the Dutch logistics system since the characteristics of fresh cut flowers (extremely short
longevity and delicacy) demands very fast yet careful transportation and handling.
3 The Netherlands has a temperate maritime climate. Average temperatures range from 2 to 17C.
4 The Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the world—and within the country,
most people live in the western part: Holland. The string of big cities along the coastal shore is called
‘‘Randstad’’. In the province of Zuidholland (where the Westland region is situated) the density figure is
1,000 people per square km. For the sake of comparison, comparable figures are only found in
Bangladesh. The average figure for Italy is 195.
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effected by warm (over 25C) and cold temperatures. The Dutch growers were
early adopters of greenhouse technology.5 Due to the availability of huge reserves
of natural gas—a genuine natural advantage of the Netherlands indeed—
production costs of vegetables and flowers could be kept relatively low. Secondly,
due to the presence of many waterways big cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and The Hague were within easy reach of the regions. Thus there was a readily
available market for fresh vegetables and flowers—demand conditions were
favourable.
In other words the comparative point of departure for the Netherlands was not
bad at all. However, more recently competition from countries with a warmer
climate and more land (vegetables from Mediterranean countries, roses from
Africa) has put considerable pressure on the competitive position of the Dutch
growers (see the explosive growth of the share in world export of Kenia and
Zambabwe, Table 1). With regard to the land issue, the regional and national
government have an official policy to relocate nurseries to less populated areas
outside the Randstad. However, growers are reluctant to move because speed is
everything in the flower cluster. It is regarded of vital importance to be at striking
distance within suppliers and customers—and all are located in the closely knit
regional district of the Westland. The ever-present traffic congestion in the
Randstad is a formidable challenge to the region. At the same time it makes
relocation outside the Randstad even less attractive because it just takes too much
time to enter the Westland. With regard to the climate issue, the strict Dutch
environmental regulation puts considerable pressure on the energy-intensive
production style of the Dutch nurseries.6 Government subsidies for natural gas
are gradually faded out, thus the comparative advantage of cheap energy vis-a-vis
competing countries is eroding.
Table 1 Main export countries
for cut flowers (world export
percentage)
Source: UNSO ITC Comtrade
database
1991 1994 Change (%)
Netherlands 64 56.5 -13
Colombia 11.5 14.1 18
Israel 4.3 4.2 -2
Kenya 1.6 2.7 41
Ecuador 0.6 2.7 78
Italy 3.3 2.4 -38
Thailand 2.2 2.1 -5
Spain 2 1.6 -25
Zimbawe 0.4 1.3 69
5 At the end of the nineteenth century the Westland region was already known for its grapes. These were
produced using sun lounges that were imported from Belgium.
6 The horticulture industry is one of the major producers of CO2 in the Netherlands.
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Competitive Advantages
According to Porter (1990a, b, 1998), in the long run, the success of an industrial
district is determined by its competitive advantages. The difficult process of
acquiring competitive advantages, however, always occurs against the backdrop of
the comparative advantages. In most cases of industrial development we studied
technology was being used to compensate for natural disadvantages.7 In the case of
the Westland, the comparative advantages (rich loamy soil, temperate maritime
climate, waterways to big cities) initially formed a protected niche for the enfant
cluster. The remarkable resilience of the region can however, be entirely attributed
to its specific socio-technical fabric—which is its core competitive advantage.8 For
more than 100 years the region has been able to fend off all threats, natural and
man-made disasters and use the newly acquired abilities as a competitive advantage
during later stages.
The Westland industrial cluster then seems to be able to constantly re-invent
itself. In response to the 1870–1880 economic crisis a quality institute avant la lettre
was established to collectively improve the quality of the production methods of the
cluster as a whole. Ultimately this led to the introduction of the auction system in
the early twentieth century and the establishment of cooperative banks and co-
operations for horticulture requisites.9 These social inventions lead to an enormous
growth of the export of vegetables.10 The world economic crisis of the 1930s had
disastrous impacts on the region and the subsequent events during WWII brought
the region to the verge of collapse. Because of its strategic location just behind the
coastal defence works the German occupiers removed all greenhouses in the
Westland and inundated large parts of the area. It took the region several years to
recover but in the 1950s the export of vegetables (ironically mostly to Germany) and
now also flowers, started to take off again—this time with an entirely new
technological infrastructure.
7 In Porter’s jargon, ‘selective factor disadvantage’ may have a stimulating effect on (technological)
innovation (Porter 1998, pp. 78–82). Examples at the national level are Canada and Australia that due to
there extensiveness are frontrunners in distant applications (e-Education, e-Health). At the regional level,
the wireless technology/satellite cluster around Calgary originates in the combination of remote sites
(mining industry) connected to a central office and rugged landscape which prohibits to use of
conventional land-based communication technology (Langford et al. 2003). The argument is also
connected to demand conditions (1998, p. 87): industries will have an advantage in market segments
which are more important at home than elsewhere (compulsory education and health care in remote areas
in Canada and Australia, serving the communication needs of remote mining plants in the Calgary
region). Also compare the remarkable evolution from the Finnish firm Nokia from a wood processing firm
into a world leader in mobile telecommunications (Ha¨ikio¨ 2002).
8 The contrast with competing regions with more favourable natural conditions is striking in this respect.
The Italian flower districts, for instance, which started to make serious inroads in European exports, are
still recovering from the severe cold which hit them in 1987. History has recently repeated in Spain.
9 It took the institute, ‘‘Westland Vereeniging’’, over 30 years to bring all growers under the collective
auction system. Ultimately, the state of emergency during WWI (during which the Netherlands remained
neutral) was used to force the resistant growers to use the auction system (by making participation to the
auction association compulsory for the submission of an export permit).
10 Especially tomatoes and cucumbers for the German market. This has remained an important market up
until today.
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During the 1960s and 1970s the cluster base was further strengthened. The shift
from vegetables to flowers continued. Most nurseries switched to greenhouses
which were initially heated by oil and later by natural gas. Consolidation occurred in
the supporting auction infrastructure. Ultimately only two big auctions remained.
During all those years the flower cluster saw a double digit growth and the export
market now embraced the entire world. After the oil crisis at the end of the 1970s
the price for natural gas rose sharply. At about the same time the environment
became an important political issue and regulation of the agriculture industry as a
whole was tightened. Once again the challenge turned out to be blessing in disguise.
Ultimately it compelled the cluster to introduce a string of technological innovations
that significantly increased yields and lowered production costs per unit.
After the early 1990s the era of eternal growth came to a halt. For the first time
supply was bigger than demand. The margins came under pressure and at the micro
level the obvious way out was to scale up production. Small family businesses were
bought up by bigger ones. The strategy of the local banks, which is closely
intertwined with the flower business, was to support the ever-bigger start-ups. Small
enterprises were no longer backed up because assumingly they could not afford the
expensive technological rat race any more. At about the same time flower export
from Africa starts to make serious inroads in the European market (Table 1).
Initially these flowers were all still traded via the two auctions in The Netherlands.
Later on the ‘African’ flower exporters set up their own auction close to Aalsmeer
(TFA).11 A growing part of the export is also directly sold to end users (e.g., from
Zimbabwe to supermarket chains in the UK). At the turn of the millennium, then,
the Westland seems to be under serious threat again. The technological superiority
of the Dutch nurseries is no longer able to offset the difference in comparative
advantages with tropical countries.12 The region itself is choking in traffic
congestion and relocation does not really seem to be an option. The holier-than-thou
attitude of the Dutch government with regard to environmental regulation leads to
unfair competition within the EU.13 Meanwhile the reversal from a demand to a
supply driven market erodes the unique collaborative culture of the region. The
continuing increases in scale leave little space for small family businesses (Table 2).
The shrinking margins put pressure on the traditional cultural openness of the
11 Most growers in Kenia and Africa are Dutch emigrants. The same goes for Brazil which has a Dutch
enclave specialised in producing seedlings (for the Dutch market). The share of imports from Africa is
constant (about 68%) but the overall volume of import is sharply rising.
12 The African nurseries are big competitors in the literal sense. One of the nurseries in Kenia has 200 ha
of roses (average size in The Netherlands is about 1 ha). About 50% is traded via (the Dutch) auctions
(used to be 100%). The other 50% is directly to wholesale and retail trade (roses are already pre-packaged
in the wrapping of the super market chain) using the own logistical infrastructure of the firm. The firm has
its own airplanes.
13 The strict observance of official international environmental regulation would in theory be beneficial
to the Dutch growers since they can easily meet the standards whereas many of their competitors cannot;
for example MPS (which is a Dutch collection of labels in various classifications—MPS A, B, C—
providing information on the social, environmental or quality aspects of a product in the flower sector)
requires fully automated processes. In practice most other countries are rather lenient and as a
consequence the green hallmarks do not function as a filter for quality. Instead these hallmarks are being
used by wholesale traders to force down market prices—which has little or nothing to do with the
environment anymore.
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sector. Peers are increasingly regarded as competitors and innovative ideas are no
longer so easily shared. Some first cautious attempts are being made by the big firms
to trade outside the (collective) auctions.
Explaining the Success of the Westland Region
Micro Level
At the firm level, the technological progress during the last decades has been
stunning. The number of flowers per square meter has quadrupled during the last
30 years. The productivity growth can be mainly attributed to an ever increasing
control of the growth process. In each successive technological innovation yet
another variable was mastered. The original soil has been replaced by artificial soil,
the water cycle has been closed, the influx of sunlight is controlled.14 and so is the
level of humidity. Currently there are experiments with artificial lightning.15 In the
near future it is expected that sensors will be used that can measure the growth
process at the level of individual plants. This would enable real-time adjustment of
the conditions in the greenhouse to the actual performance of plants. None of the
more recent innovations would have been possible without the use of IT. An
average greenhouse has about 500 variables that need to be controlled—most of
these variables are interlinked and also have second order effects that need to be
controlled.16
It is however not the use of (information) technology per se which gives the
Westland its competitive edge. Porter is a long-time advocate of the strategic
positioning of a business in a given industry (Porter 1979, 1998). The focus on the
Table 2 Percentage of family
workers in each industry in 2002
(in brackets the decrease
recorded over 2000–2002)
Source: http://www.tuinbouw.
nl/website/ptcontent.nsf/home
2002 (%) Change
Flowers under glass 21 (-22%)
Vegetables under glass 22 (-21%)
Flowers (outside growth) 39 (NA)
Bulbs (always outside growth) 39 (NA)
14 This innovation is a direct outcome of the tight Dutch environmental regulation (Porter and van der
Linde 1995). In order to reduce energy consumption in the horticulture industry the Dutch government
made the use of sun blinds obligatory. Growers initially were reluctant to use the new technology since it
reduced the influx of light and hence directly affected the yield. However, the technology turned out to be
a blessing in disguise. By dynamically controlling the sun blinds the irregularity of the natural patterns of
sunshine could be evened out. This has significantly increased rather than decreased yields. The latest
process innovation is to directly feed highly localized weather forecasts into the computers that control
the movement of the blinds (Meteoconsult, mimeo).
15 This is a rather energy-intensive method that might not be economically feasible at all—or only at a
very large scale.
16 For instance, too much or too frequent changes will slow down the growth of plants (in the words of
one of the nurserymen we interviewed, ‘‘they get stressed’’…) The special process computers that are
needed to control the greenhouses are developed and produced by local Westland firms such as Priva
(http://www.priva.nl).
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business environment is at the heart of his work. He does however, have a blind spot
for the inherent qualities of a firm or cluster of firms, such as proclaimed by the
resource-based approach. The core competency of a firm or cluster is the collective
learning, especially how to co-ordinate diverse production skills and integrate
multiple streams of technology (Prahalad and Hamel 1990, emphasis added). It is
exactly this collective learning which has enabled a constant rapid spread of new
ideas and innovation within the Westland cluster. The exchange of in-depth
knowledge about businesses processes between peers has been one of the hallmarks
of the region and is rooted in a very old tradition. The sharing of potentially
strategic information with competitors might in the short run appear contra
productive but makes sense at the longer run (Pfeffer 1994). Innovations are rarely
individual achievements. Collaborating on new ideas upgrades the cluster as a
whole and eventually pays off for all individual members. The use of ICT has just
made the sharing of information easier. For instance, the logs of the process
computers are centrally stored and meticulously studied to find optimal settings for
the process computers.17
The remarkable openness of the cluster is not so much due to individual
characteristics but rather to the constant growth of productivity in an ever expanding
market. Under the present situation of overproduction and shrinking margins,
growers are increasingly reluctant to cooperate and share potentially strategic
information. In a sense, this is a perverse effect of the very success of the cluster.
Because each subsequent major technological innovation seems to be more capital-
intensive overall technological progress induces increases of scale. At the same
time, the constant expansion of the market has now truly created a global market.
The competition from countries with comparative advantages is on the rise. The
only way Dutch nurseries can survive is to introduce yet another innovation at an
even faster pace. This is a direct attack on the social fabric of the region. Family
business are disappearing, the increases in scale lead to overproduction, lower
margins, more competition and less openness. The share of family workers is
rapidly going down and more than a 20% decrease was recorded over the 2000–
2002 period. Eventually, in the Netherlands, only a few big nurseries might survive
and ultimately they might relocate major parts of their production to tropical
countries—not an unlikely scenario when these big firms are bought up by
multinationals. Only the supporting functions (logistics, auctions, services) might
remain vital and strong in The Netherlands.18
Meso Level
Although the Dutch flower cluster exports its products (usually within 24 h) to every
imaginable corner of the world, the production itself occurs on a relatively small
17 See, for instance, http://www.groeinet.nl.
18 Den Hertog et al. (2001) state that it remains to be seen whether the presence of an own primary
production is a necessary precondition to maintain the nexus of the global logistical system in The
Netherlands. They argue that at least some production should be done in The Netherlands in order to keep
the knowledge up to standards.
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regional scale. Thus it combines the advantages of producing for a world market (a
huge marketing area, experiencing world-class competition) with the advantages of
a small industrial district (e.g., proximity, dense social networks).19 What makes the
Westland cluster unique is its extreme degree of interwoven ness and the local
presence of a great number of highly specialized related and supporting industries
(e.g., firms specialized in transport and packaging of flowers, laboratories dedicated
to horticulture, the auctions etc.20)—the fourth corner of Porter’s diamond.
The biggest competitive advantage of the Westland cluster is the concentration of
a very complete range of products and services (Fig. 1). At an early stage the cluster
already reached a scale which enabled extreme specialisation (see, for instance,
Jacobs and de Jong 1992). Of crucial importance is the tight coupling between
production and trade—also in terms of physical proximity. Especially for cut
flowers, freshness rules and time is everything. The time frame is in hours, not in
days.
Fig. 1 The Dutch flower cluster at a glance
19 In this respect the Westland might not be much different from a typical industrial district. Within The
Netherlands, the region is rather unique (the only comparable cluster may be the Dutch dairy industry).
20 In the transport component, for instance, not only are there numerous local firms specialized in the
transport of flowers but they are even further specialized in the transport of specific types of flowers. In
the non ‘‘green’’ services, the local banks are completely tuned to the special financial needs of nurseries
(which includes very attractive financial schemes for [re]starting of nurseries—the banks know it is safe
business).
312 E. Tavoletti, R. te Velde
123
A Core Value Adding Activity: Logistics and the Auctions
The logistics chain is tightly integrated. The auctions—which are collectively
owned by all growers21—are the heart of the chain. Nurseries electronically send
information on their flowers and plants to the auction in advance.22 Customers
(exporters and wholesalers) can see what is on offer before the auction clock starts
running. They can also pass this information on to all their customers in Europe and
abroad. The ‘Clock Supply Online’ supply information system, which can be
viewed by buying companies, enables customers to see which flowers and plants are
to be auctioned the next day, and their quantities and numbers.
Transactions are settled in an extremely efficient way. In the Aalsmeer auction
alone, every day 19 million flowers and 2 million plants are being sold—and the
auction closes at 11:30. There are nearly 300 species of flower sold, each of which
has a number of varieties.23 In addition to this, most flowers are available in
different quality classes and stem lengths. By noon, all these flowers are on their
way to their final destination, either by truck of airplane. Usually they arrive the
same day at their destination. The auctions are in fact so efficient that flowers from
abroad are being shipped to The Netherlands for the sole reason of being traded at
the auctions.
A small but growing proportion of transactions is directly being closed between
an exporter/wholesale trader and a client.24 Although such ‘mediated’ transactions
formally bypass the auctions they usually still make use of the infrastructure of the
auctions. This is because the logistical and financial system of the auctions is highly
efficient. For instance, the auctions always settle financial transactions within a
week, regardless whether the client has paid for the flowers or not. However, the rise
(or rather: return) of the middlemen undermines the very existence of the auctions
which were precisely founded as a collective stronghold of the nurseries against the
21 Bloemenveiling Aalsmeer (VBA) is a cooperative in the joint ownership of 3,500 member growers
which was born as a typically Dutch reaction to the power of the middlemen. The members appoint a
board of nine from among their ranks, all of whom are growers, to determine policy. A chairman, a vice-
chairman and a secretary are selected from this board. Management and the implementation of policy are
in the hands of the three general management members (managing director, commercial director and
operational director). The Supervisory Board provides policy recommendations and verification. Half of
the members of this board are member growers while the other half are experts drawn from Dutch
industry and university life. The 3,500 cooperative members are grouped into 15 regionally active
sections, each with a section board. The section boards and cooperative management regularly gather
during policy meetings. General meetings take place twice a year, to which all members are invited.
22 A standardized electronic consignment note is being used. A printout of the note is attached to the
trailers with flowers. Specialized transport firms pick up the trailers from the nurseries (and drop empty
ones for the next day) and deliver the flowers to the auctions.
23 For example, there are 300 gerberas, over 500 chrysanthemums and 400 different roses. The incredible
variation in flowers is a result from the differentiation strategy that was been followed by most Dutch
growers up to the early 1990s. After the shift in favourable market conditions (demand no longer
exceeded supply) the increasing pressure on margins forced many growers to turn to a cost domination
strategy.
24 One example is the wholesale trader Metz which directly delivers flowers from nurseries to its
customers around Europe. Customers can place their orders via Metz’ own electronic system IRIS (see
http://www.metz.nl/en/index.html). The financial settlement is still via one of the auctions.
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middlemen. Hence the strict obligation for all members (the nursery men) to offer
their products exclusively via the auction. The decision to also allow mediated
transactions via the auction infrastructure (and even to be active on the mediation
market—via MVA), hence to ‘sleep with the enemy’, seems to be dictated by rather
pragmatic considerations: the acceptance of the rise of mediated transactions as a
matter of fact and the attempt to keep that part of the trade at least partly under
control.25
Due to its sheer size and range of flowers it is nearly impossible to replicate the
Dutch auctions elsewhere. They are truly a global nexus of demand and supply. In
the Aalsmeer auction alone, over 6,000 growers world-wide supply flowers which
are bought by over 1,100 wholesalers and exporters; the annual turnover is over
1.5 billion euro, including cut flowers, houseplants and garden plants (the service
turnover, including packaging turnover and profits from tenancies and leases, is
158 million euro). Around 10,000 individuals work within the Bloemenveiling
Aalsmeer complex (including those working for exporters, wholesaler’s banks,
transporters and other service providers). This can rise to 12,000 during peak
periods such as St Valentine’s Day or Mother’s Day. So far there has been only one
alternative which has succeeded to operate independently of the auctions: the
Teleflower Auction (TFA).26 Yet it is still located in The Netherlands, at striking
distance from the Aalsmeer auction and Schiphol Airport.
Market prospects for both Aalsmeer and Naaldwijk are good and a 45% increase
in sales is expected in the next 10 years. The direct trade flows form a significant
area for concern (MVA increase in Aalsmeer is in that sense a signal that the market
demand not just auctions and low prices but also increasingly tailored relationships
between producers and traiders), but with good commercial instruments and by
offering professional services at competitive rates they will still be able to attract a
broad and deep international supply, and this automatically represents purchase
power. Dutch export of horticultural products has been increasing constantly in
recent years: Russia, Denmark and Italy are the fastest growing export markets in
EU (Table 3).
A Synthesis of the Dutch Case
The Competitive advantage of nations is one of the most influential books on
development theory. At its publication in 1990 it has received an enormous interest
in the press and media. That reception of the book in the academic community was
much less warm not to say the least, up to a point where Davies and Ellis amended
Grant’s initial judgement from ‘gloriously rich but hopelessly intractable’ (Grant
1991, pp. 542–553) to ‘hopelessly rich but gloriously wrong’ (Davies and Ellis
2000, p. 1210).
25 Marketing & Sales Aalsmeer (MVA) is the active sales organisation of the VBA. MVA helps to gear
products to the wishes and needs of the market as accurately as possible, and provides expert advice in
customised operations. MVA also provides customers with tailored supply information. In 2003 11% of
cut flowers transactions (up from 9% in 2002 and 8% in 2001).
26 TFA is specialized in roses grown outside the Netherlands (especially Africa).
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The major point of criticism is that Porter’s ‘competitive advantages’ are nothing
new under the sun. It is merely a (faulty) popularisation of the well-established vast
theoretical body of work on comparative advantages (Davies and Ellis 2000,
p. 1199). For instance, on the one hand, classical comparative advantages are one of
the corner stones of his diamond model (the ‘factor conditions’). On the other hand,
comparative disadvantages are an important stimulus for technological innovation,
which is the primal driving force in Porter’s model. Secondly, Porter mixes up two
objects of analysis, the nation state and the firm. The fact that it is not clear at all
what exactly defines a ‘nation’ or a ‘home-based firm’ renders his central thesis that
the nation’s prosperity depends upon that of its home base firms void of any
meaning (Reich 1990, 1991). Thirdly, Porter’s diamond model seems to be
particularly flawed if applied to small, open trading economies (Davies and Ellis
2000, pp. 1203–1204).
Fourthly, all these comments are valid by there is more to it. The central thesis of
The competitive advantage of nations is that successful companies are characterized
by strong export figures, and that their success is based on a geographically
concentrated ‘diamond’ in their home country. There is indeed little empirical
evidence to support this claim, thus most of the critique seems to be justified.
However, the Dutch case is one of the rare empirical examples which actually
strongly confirms Porter’s model—despite the fact that it is located in The
Netherlands, a prime example of a small, open trading economy. The geographic
concentration of the Westland region, with its dense local network of related and
supporting industries, has made it the most successful flower exporting region in the
world. Thus it is the strong home based diamond which seems to give the Westland
its cutting edge—despite the apparent presence of comparative disadvantages (cold
climate, lack of land, high labour costs).
Porter’s model, however, misses three important points when it comes to the
explanation of the exceptional success of the Dutch flower cluster. First and
foremost, the model does not explain how the four determinants of the diamond—
factor conditions, demand conditions, related and supporting industry, and firm
Table 3 Dutch export of
horticultural products (sales
turnover million of euro)
Source: Dutch Floricultural
Wholesale Board
2001 2002 2003 D% 2003/2002
Germany 1,496 1,512 1,585 5
UK 652 729 741 2
France 594 606 649 7
Italy 257 281 317 13
Belgium 147 164 184 12
Switzerland 128 141 134 -5
Austria 121 127 133 5
Denmark 99 107 123 15
USA 144 143 115 -20
Russia 74 87 104 20
Other countries 600 671 678 1
Total 4,312 4,568 4,763 4
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strategy, structure and rivalry—combine to create self-reinforcing conditions in
which a nations firm succeed internationally. Especially, the evolutionary stand of
the model does not explain why factor conditions—comparative advantages—are
sometimes drivers and sometimes obstacles (Davies and Ellis 2000, p. 1190). One of
the key findings of the Dutch case is that comparative advantages and competitive
advantages are not opposed but they actually reinforce each other.
One major legacy of the diamond is, in fact, a clear and sharp distinction in the
debate between ‘comparative advantages’, based on cheap labour and climate, and
‘competitive advantages’, based on the diamond as a whole: ‘According to the
standard economic theory, factors of production—labour, land, natural resources,
capital, infrastructure—will determine the flow of trade [..]. This doctrine, whose
origins date back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo [..], is at best incomplete and at
worst incorrect’ (Porter 1990b, p. 78). So that the old Ricardian ‘comparative
advantages’ are not really part of the diamond itself, because the diamond side
called ‘factor conditions’ is related to the factors nations are able to create. Such a
contrast was drawn clearly by Porter himself and its one of its main legacy: ‘‘broad
distinctions are drawn between ‘basic’ factors like climate and unskilled labour and
‘advanced’ factors which have to be created, like computer scientist and
communication infrastructures’ (Davies and Ellis 2000, p. 1190).
The Dutch flower cluster shows that such a contrast may well be solved out. All
eventual strong diamonds have to originate from comparative advantages. In the
particular case of the Westland, these where the fertile lands behind the dunes. From
the onset, these comparative advantages where accompanied by favourable demand
conditions (nearby big cities that could be reached by waterways). Based on this
good starting point, the Dutch growers could then introduce a new technological
innovation (sun lounges from Belgium) to overcome the comparative disadvantage
of a bleak climate. The sun lounges were later perfected into sophisticated
greenhouses which where also a technological answer to the ever-increasing
pressure on land use. Around the greenhouse industry, a vast and densely knit
supporting industry (with a strong science and technology base) sprung up. The
conquest of the world market was further supported by the exploitation of a hitherto
unused comparative advantage—natural gas. More recently, yet another disadvan-
tages—the stern environmental policy of the Dutch government—has pushed the
growers even further into technological innovation—something akin the way the
high degree of unionization pushed Italian car manufacturers to automate
(O’Shaughnessy 1996, p. 19).
Neither comparative advantages nor competitive advantages alone can explain
the worldwide success of the Westland region. The phenomenal success of the
Westland can only be described as a constant leapfrogging between the two types of
(dis)advantages—there is continuous interaction. The fact that Porter is silent on
how this interaction occurs is because of his bias towards technological innovation.
He therefore greatly underestimates the importance of social innovation—this is his
second major omission. In the particular case of the Westland, the establishment of
the cooperatives and the auctions where probably at least as important as the
technological innovations. Eventually this resulted in a local culture that was very
open and inducive to the diffusion of all kinds of technological innovations. Thus a
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major strength from the Westland region—its ability for collective learning—comes
from within. This argument is much closer to the resource-based perspective and to
the most recent cluster literature (Asheim et al. 2006) than to Porter’s emphasis on
external pressure. Related to this is Porter’s bias towards local competition as a
driver for innovation. Although there might have been competition between the
Dutch growers it is not a Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’—the foundation of the
entire Porterian edifice (Aktouf et al. 2005, p 198). It could rather be characterised
as a constructive process of mimesis.
Ironically, the constant stream of technological innovations—which are so much
hailed by Porter, is now undermining the particular social fabric of the Westland
region. Increases in scale—which are a direct consequence of the dominant high
tech/high investment strategy—are quickly putting an end to the smaller family
businesses. The gap between the front runners and the vast group of followers has
strongly grown lately (Den Hertog and Kern 2007, p. 9). The big firms are leaving
the cooperative auctions and go on their own. The open innovation culture is
quickly eroding—exclusivity and the protection of intellectual property rights are on
the rise (Den Hertog and Kern 2007, p. 12). Ultimately, the disappearance of mutual
learning might lead to the collapse of the Westland cluster—one of Porter’s last
remaining diamonds.
However, the end of the diamond does not necessarily imply the end of the Dutch
greeneries. Porter’s third major omission is that he does not see that a firm can
eventually do very well changing its original location. He distinguishes three
successive stages in which the competitive advantages are upgraded. The first stage
is factor-driven, the second investment driven, and the third innovation-driven
(Yetton et al. 1992, p. 93). There is a logical linear order in this as it describes a
dynamic process moving from a factor-based situation via a situation where
technology is being used to further exploit the factor conditions to a situation where
technological innovation has become a driver on its own and factor conditions are
no longer relevant. The last (innovation-driven) stage seems to be the maximum
situation. The subsequent ‘wealth-driven’ stage that Porter distinguishes is therefore
inevitably one of drift and decline (Porter 1990a, b, p. 546). When the Westland
remains to be locked into the high-tech/high investment strategy this might indeed
be an accurate prediction.
There is however, an alternative strategy which is much more in line with the
dynamic leapfrogging process between comparative and competitive advantages
(Den Hertog and Kern 2007, p. 16). All strong diamonds do indeed originate from
favourable factor conditions. This is the thesis of the comparative advantage
paradigm. In the two following stages competitive advantages are the driving force.
This is Porter’s antithesis of competitive advantages. But this is not where it
necessarily ends. In the fourth stage, comparative advantages and competitive
advantages are combined by firms who leave their original home base and move to
nations with better comparative advantages. They can do so because the competitive
advantages are not only situated in the local homebase (Martin and Sunley 2003),
the diamond of external pressures, but also and predominantly embodied in the
skills and knowledge of the people (Aktouf et al. 2005, p. 189). This closes the loop.
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The factor-driven stage starts all over again, but due to the presence of people-
embodied competitive advantages this time on a higher level.27
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